Consciousness and Complexity or Conciousness and Resonance? by Grossberg, Stephen & Raizada, Rajeev D.S.
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Cognitive & Neural Systems CAS/CNS Technical Reports
1999-01-18




Consciousness and complexity 
or 
Consciousness and resonance? 
Stephen Grossherg and Rajeev D. S. Raizada 
January 1999 
Technical Report CAS/CNS-99-004 
Permission to copy without fcc all or part of this material is granted provided that: 1. The copies arc not 
made or distributed for direct commercial advantage; 2. the report title, author, document number, ru1d 
release date appear, and notice is given that copying is by permission of the BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
CENTER FOR ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS AND DEPARTMENT OF COGNITIVE AND NEURAL 
SYSTEMS. To copy otherwise, or to republish, requires a fcc and I or special permission. 
Copyright © 1999 
Boston University Center for Adaptive Systems and 
Department of Cognitive and Neural Systems 
677 Beacon Street 
Boston, MA 02215 
CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMPLEXITY 
OR 
CONSCIOUSNESS AND RESONANCE? 
by 
Stephen Grossberg* and Rajeev D.S. Raizada** 
Department of Cognitive and Neural Systems 
Boston University 
677 Beacon Street 
Boston, MA 02215 
Phone: 617-353-7858 or-7857 
Fax: 617-353-7755 
Email: steve@cns.bu.edu, rajeev@cns.bu.edu 
A Letter on: 
G. Tononi and G.M. Edelman, Science 282, 1846 (1998) 
January 18, 1999 
Word count: 304 
Technical Report CAS/CNS TR-99-004 
*Supported in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Office of Naval 
Research (ONR N00014-95-1-0409), the National Science Foundation (NSF IRI 97-20333) and 
the Office of Naval Research (ONR N00014-95-l-0657). 
**Supported in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Office of Naval 
Research (ONR N00014-95-l-0409), the National Science Foundation (NSF IRI 94-01659) and 
the Office of Naval Research (ONR N00014-92-J-1309 and ONR N00014-95-1-0657). 
Tononi and Edelman ( 1) suggest that "conscious experience is integrated ... and at the same time it 
is highly differentiated", that "integration [occurs] ... through reentrant interactions", and that 
"attention may increase ... conscious salience". They also note that "cortical regions ... for con-
trolling action ... may not contribute significantly to conscious experience". 
An alternative theory unifies these several hypotheses into a single hypothesis: "All conscious 
states are resonant states" (2), and suggests how resonant states enable brains to learn about a 
changing world throughout life (3). Resonance arises when bottom-up and top-down, or "re-
entrant", processes reach an attentive consensus between what is expected and what is in the 
world. Because resonance dynamically regulates learning of sensory and cognitive representa-
tions, this theory is called adaptive resonance theory, or ART. 
ART implies all the properties noted by Tononi and Edelman, but also clarifies their critical link to 
learning, and explains why only a certain type of excitatory top-down matching can stabilize 
learning (4): When top-down attentional signals match bottom-up sensory input, their mutual 
excitation strengthens and maintains existing neural activity long enough for synaptic changes to 
occur. Thus, attentionally relevant stimuli are learned, while irrelevant stimuli are suppressed and 
hence prevented from destabilizing existing memories. Recent experiments support these predic-
tions during vision (5), audition (6), and learning (7). 
Why dorsal cortical circuits that control action do not support consciousness now follows easily: 
Such circuits use inhibitory matching. For example, after moving your arm to an expected posi-
tion, movement stops (viz., is inhibited) because "where you want to move" matches "where you 
are" (8). Inhibitory matches do not resonate, hence are not conscious. 
A detailed model of how the laminar circuits of neocortex use resonance to control cortical devel-
opment, learning, attention, and grouping of information has recently been proposed (9), and sug-
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